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ABSTRACT
Who is best placed to provide justice effectively and 
equitably to the breadth of Afghan society?
State and non-state justice providers are both part of 
the problem and potentially part of the solution. Despite 
significant strides being made in Afghanistan’s formal 
justice system, it still struggles to deliver an accessible 
and inclusive service. Widespread corruption and 
neglect especially in rural areas are among the most 
serious contemporary challenges.
Informal institutions are the primary justice provider for 
many communities, resolving disputes through jirgas, 
shuras and ulema where the formal sector is absent, 
exclusive or mistrusted. But traditional bodies also 
bring challenges, from poor record-keeping to gender 
exclusion, human rights violations and illicit practices. 
Taliban justice is also a significant feature of the 
informal sphere.
A hybrid system that draws on formal and informal 
institutions can offer a way forward, linked by new 
institutions that prioritise human and women’s 
rights. A sophisticated hybrid model has previously 
been developed but has experienced resistance from 
existing justice institutions. More recently there 
has been renewed interest in it from the Ministry 
of Justice and elsewhere.
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Justice in Afghanistan has made significant progress 
since the 2001 Bonn Agreement. But despite advances, 
the state justice system continues to face major challenges 
to deliver accessible, transparent and sustainable justice 
to all Afghans. As reported by the Special Investigator for 
Afghanistan in 2015, in spite of US expenditure of well 
over $1 billion to 2015, Afghanistan’s justice sector still 
struggles to deliver effective and sustainable justice.
The Bonn Agreement set out the terms for the foundation of 
a Judicial Reform Commission. But when the Commission 
was established in early 2002, it comprised mainly retired 
Afghan officials who had returned from long periods of exile 
and were not familiar either with modern practice or the new 
legally pluralistic environment. Existing justice institutions 
prior to Bonn had also been damaged by successive 
wars since the Soviet invasion, while multiple regimes 
had introduced new, often inconsistent laws, procedures 
and practices. The most serious challenges to justice in 
Afghanistan today are endemic corruption and neglect of 
rural areas, where the bulk of the population lives.
A potential way forward that remains under-explored 
relates to engaging non-state justice providers. Until 2009, 
international efforts largely ignored non-state justice 
providers, despite the fact that many were popularly 
perceived as more legitimate than the state’s justice system 
and, in fact, were the main source of dispute resolution for 
most Afghans. After 2009, international aid agencies began 
to develop some interest in non-state and traditional justice 
providers, despite opposition from the Afghan state and 
the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC). But international support has still allocated only a 
small fraction of its budget to non-state justice.
Any new political settlement to end the war in Afghanistan 
needs to acknowledge the breadth of relevant justice 
institutions – state and non-state – and acknowledge 
their functions in supporting sustainable peace. Key to 
developing an equitable justice system is to engage Afghan 
capacity in women’s and human rights. Experiences in 
advancing a ‘hybrid model’ for justice in Afghanistan since 
2009 point to viable ways forward.
Achievements since Bonn
Internationally sponsored judicial reform since Bonn has 
supported the development of technical capacity of justice 
personnel, and thousands of judges, prosecutors, police 
officers, prison wardens and officials at the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ) have been trained. The quality of professional 
legal education inside Afghanistan has expanded 
exponentially, with 17 state universities and 96 private 
institutes of higher education now providing legal training 
through law or shari’a faculties.
Alongside the expansion of the MoJ’s General Directorate 
of Taqneen (Legislation), many existing laws have been 
amended and new laws enacted. A new, unified crimi nal code 
was officially introduced in November 2017, which updates 
relevant legislation including those relating to the elimi nation 
of violence against women, anticorruption, anti-money-
laundering, anti-human-trafficking and counter-terrorism. 
Judicial case management and administration of justice 
have improved through extensive technical training as well 
as internal reforms, including new procedures with regard 
to coordination between the Supreme Court, the Attorney 
General’s Office, the MoJ and the Afghan National Police.
Justice institutions in many regional and provincial centres 
have been equipped with modern facilities to enhance 
accessibility of substantive legal material. Institutional 
support has been developed through a number of channels, 
including the Independent National Legal Training Centre 
(INLTC) in Kabul, Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Justice 
Centre (ACJC), specialist courts and prosecution offices, 
the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA), legal 
aid department, and the Human Rights Support Unit (HRSU) 
at the Ministry of Justice. Many more female judges, 
prosecutors and police officers have been hired. Local 
awareness of women’s rights has been raised in many 
areas, for example reflected in increased rejection of the 
practice of baad among Afghan ordinary people, as reported 
by the Asia Foundation in 2017. Baad refers to the practice 
whereby the family of a murderer offer women in marriage 
in compensation to the family of the victim.
Key obstacles: corruption and rural neglect
Corruption
Widespread corruption in Afghanistan’s justice institutions 
is closely connected to the post-Taliban political structure, 
which has relied heavily on pro-government – or more 
accurately ‘anti-Taliban’ – warlords to maintain order 
at both local and regional level, as reported by Jones 
in 2010. Warlords-turned politicians have staffed 
important political, security and justice positions with 
their own factional followers, building networks of 
endemic corruption, bribery, nepotism and clientelism. 
Respondents to an Integrity Watch Afghanistan study in 
2016 named ‘courts, municipalities and prosecution 
offices’ as the three most corrupt Afghan institutions.
Judicial corruption has had huge negative implications 
for trust in the state justice system. Most Afghans look 
to non-state justice institutions, including in some areas 
to the Taliban’s parallel judiciary. Despite recent efforts 
to designate some apparently more impartial senior 
appointees, Houlihan and Spencer have reported that the 
Ministry of Interior remains largely administered by former 
Northern Alliance affiliates. The National Directorate 
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of Security maintains similar links, while other justice 
sector institutions are mainly divided between political 
affiliates of the President and the Chief Executive. Efforts to 
coordinate different components of the justice system have 
not been effective, reflecting the lack of a coherent vision 
for fundamental structural reform of the of Afghanistan’s 
justice sector as a whole.
Rural neglect
State justice institutions in rural areas have received 
scant attention compared with Kabul and other urban and 
provincial centres. Significant increases in the number 
of female judges have been largely restricted to Kabul 
(90 per cent), with the remaining 10 per cent in only four 
additional provinces, according to Madzarevic and Rao in 
2014. Newly established institutions to support the justice 
sector similarly lack reach throughout Afghanistan, such 
as INLTC, AIBA and HRSU. Houlihan and Spencer in 2017 
pointed out that the Juvenile Appeal Court, High Anti-
Corruption Court, the Serious Crimes Court, and all eight 
chambers of the Supreme Court are situated in Kabul. 
State justice in rural Afghanistan further remains largely 
male-dominated, inaccessible and ill-equipped. For 
example, AIBA under-resourcing means it has struggled to 
provide assistance to rural litigants.
Rural insecurity has hampered judicial reform – 
although the inability of the state to provide effective 
and transparent local justice is itself a prime cause of 
insecurity. Furthermore, according to Swenson in 2017, 
the relationship between justice and insecurity in rural 
areas has been further complicated by the fact that 
international investment in non-state traditional justice 
since 2009–10 has been framed as a component of US-led 
counterinsurgency efforts. Also, paramilitary policing has 
been prioritised over community policing, undermining not 
only the professionalism and transparency of Afghanistan’s 
justice system, but also local perceptions that justice is for 
ordinary people’s welfare.
Filling the local vacuum: multiple 
justice providers
The space left behind by gaps in the state justice system 
at local level is filled by a multiplicity of non-state justice 
providers. This includes in some parts of the country, 
according to Giustozzi, Franco and and Baczko, the 
Taliban’s parallel judiciary. Field research over the past 
15 years by the author and others has shown that the most 
prevalent non-state institutions for local dispute resolution 
are the traditional village jirga (circle) or shura (council). 
Primarily civil but also criminal local cases are addressed 
through speengiri or rishsafidan (greybeards) with a 
reputation for wisdom, piety, honesty, and local knowledge 
and dispute resolution expertise. However, recent field 
research by the author has revealed various other non-
state justice providers. The ‘continuum’ of justice providers 
in Afghanistan is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Continuum of official, semi-official, unofficial 
and anti-state justice providers in Afghanistan
State JS
MoWA
AIHRC
INGOS
NGOs
Wakil-e-Gozars (cities)
Jirga and Shura (rural villages)
Ulema and religious institutions
Taliban justice and mobile courts
Source: Wardak (2019–forthcoming). Justice providers cited above include: State 
Justice System; Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA); Afghanistan Independent 
Human Rights Commission (AIHRC); International NGOs; National NGOs; wakil-
e-gozars (local representatives) in urban areas; jirga/shura in both rural and 
urban areas; religious educational institutions, and individual members of ulema 
(Islamic religious scholars/jurists); and the Taliban’s judiciary. The various justice 
providers illustrated in figure 1 are ranked according their level of proximity to 
the state – from the most official, through official, semi-official and unofficial to 
anti-state justice structures.
Research indicates that non-state justice providers 
(especially jirgas and shuras) are perceived as more 
accessible, more legitimate, more effective, less corrupt, 
more trusted, and speedier in resolving disputes than the 
Afghan state courts. However, Stahlmann has also stressed 
that jirga and shura exclude women, do not officially record 
their decisions, sometimes violate Afghan law and human 
rights, and can be influenced by warlords. Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding challenges associated with non-state 
justice providers, until recently few concrete efforts have 
been made to use their positive potential as complementary 
elements of the state justice system.
Institutionalising a hybrid model for justice
Customary dispute resolution in civil and commercial 
disputes is recognised by Afghanistan’s Civil Code (1976). 
Article Two states that: ‘When there is no provision in 
the law or in the fundamental principles of the Hanafi 
jurisprudence of Islamic shari’a, the court shall issue a 
ruling in accordance with general custom, provided that 
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the custom is not contradictory to the provisions of this law 
and to the principles of justice.’ Various other Afghan laws 
include provisions on informal mediation between litigants. 
But customary adjudication is not recognised as legally 
binding unless cases are initially registered officially. And 
research by the author to be published in 2019 has shown 
that despite some pragmatic interaction between formal 
and informal justice providers, most criminal and civil 
disputes are dealt with outside the state justice system.
How the hybrid model works
The author along with others developed a hybrid model of 
the justice system in Afghanistan, which was advocated in 
2007 in the Afghanistan Human Development Report of 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This 
model proposed a coherent framework for complementary 
institutional links between the existing state justice system, 
various non-state justice providers, and women’s and 
human rights institutions – as Figure 2 illustrates.
The hybrid model advocates alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) and human rights units functioning alongside 
the state justice system. ADR Units would provide 
disputants with help and advice to select an existing 
non-state justice institution appropriate to deal with their 
case. Disputants would be free to select any appropriate 
mechanism, excluding in current circumstances Taliban 
justice as ‘anti-state’ and opposed to interaction with 
official institutions. ADR mechanisms would handle minor 
criminal offenses and civil cases, offering disputants the 
choice to refer to the nearest state court. Serious criminal 
cases would fall exclusively under the remit of the state 
justice system.
The proposed Human Rights Unit (HRU) would be mandated 
to monitor and approve ADR decisions in order to ensure 
consistency with human rights principles. The HRU would 
be further empowered to examine issues relating to 
domestic violence, past human rights abuses and war 
crimes. ADR decisions would also need to be endorsed by 
the nearest primary justice institution – a court or relevant 
rights (hoquq) department. This is to ensure that ADR 
decisions do not violate Afghanistan’s law or the 
fundamental principles of shari’a.
Civil Disputes, Criminal Incidents,
and Human Rights Violations
Human Rights
Violation Incidents
Serious Criminal
Incidents
Satisfactory
Resolution
Unsatisfactory
Resolution
Unsatisfactory
Resolution
Satisfactory
Resolution
Major Civil
Disputes
Police
Attorney
General
Ministry of Justice
Hoquq Department
Court of Justice
Outcome
Appeal, Acquittal, Fine, Prison, Others
Minor Civil Disputes
and Criminal Incidents
Human Rights
Oversight
(internal/external)
ADR
Jirgas, CDCs, CSOs,
PAs, Other
Figure 2: Hybrid model of the justice system in Afghanistan
Source: Afghanistan Human Development Report (2007)
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Interactions between state and non-state justice institutions 
can occur through formal correspondence, physical 
participation or other appropriate ways. Decisions reached 
would be officially registered as legally binding. However as 
Figure 2 illustrates, ADR decisions that failed to be endorsed 
by either the HRU or the relevant state court, or that were 
rejected by at least one disputant, would need to be revised 
or referred to the state justice system for processing and 
adjudication. In this way, the hybrid framework proposes 
both a collaborative dialogue between various state and 
non-state justice providers and local rights organisations, 
and the empowerment of women through raising awareness 
of their rights and supporting spaces for contestation.
How the hybrid model has progressed
The UNDP Report was rejected by Afghanistan’s Supreme 
Court in 2007. Senior judges saw it as a threat to their 
authority, and its recommendations as a potential avenue 
to divert international aid away from the state. Still, the 
report’s hybrid model nevertheless stimulated debate 
and practical interest in operationalising some of its 
recommendations. Some international organisations 
strongly supported the Report, including the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) and some other national and 
international actors, as reported by the NRC in 2007.
The idea of the hybrid model also began to get some 
traction within the Afghan state, although progress has 
been slow and strenuous. Recommendations of the hybrid 
model were strongly reflected in the 2009 National Policy 
on the Relationship between the Formal Justice System 
and Dispute Resolution Councils, drafted by the Ministry of 
Justice in conjunction with the United States Institute for 
Peace. The policy was not officially endorsed and various 
international organisations resorted to programmes 
focused on other initiatives such as training traditional local 
mediators, raising legal awareness, promoting women’s 
rights and coordination between state and the state 
justice systems.
The MoJ revisited the hybrid model’s recommendations 
in 2010, producing a draft Law on Dispute Resolution 
Shuras and Jirgas. The AIHRC, MoWA and other powerful 
officials rejected the inclusion of minor criminal offenses 
in the draft law, however, and it was withdrawn from 
Afghanistan’s Council of Minister’s meeting in 2010. In 
2015–16, the Afghan government, with the support of 
UNDP, produced a new draft Law on Conciliation Jirgas in 
Civil Disputes. This was forwarded by the MoJ to the Council 
of Ministers in 2016, which has now approved the draft 
following minor (but unwarranted) amendments proposed 
by the government’s Legislation Committee.
The new law is useful. But because it focuses exclusively 
on civil matters, it only partly represents the hybrid model. 
Full implementation of logic of the hybrid model can link 
all justice providers illustrated in Figure 1, and thereby 
provide inclusive, sustainable and restorative justice to 
all citizens. In time, this may also include some of the 
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Taliban judiciary.”
“
Alli Wardak interviewing elders in Eastern Afghanistan, 2014. © Ali Wardak
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Taliban’s parallel justice mechanisms. It is hard to imagine 
linking Taliban justice to Afghan state justice institutions 
while the war continues. However, in practice Taliban 
justice already has links with jirga, shura and ulema based 
structures of local dispute resolution in specific ways and 
contexts. Capitalising on these local links may provide for 
a potential peacemaking mechanism between the Afghan 
State and the Taliban. More broadly, as the justice vacuum 
is most acutely felt at the local level, institutionalising 
links between male-dominated jirgas and shuras, religious 
institutions, women’s and human rights organisations, and 
state justice institutions could provide more accessible, 
transparent, fairer and humane justice to all.
Conclusion
International investments in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban 
state justice institutions over the past 16 years, have resulted 
in the (re)building of a functioning modern justice system, 
including reconstruction of justice infrastructure, creation of 
new justice institutions, enactment of new laws and reform 
of existing ones, capacity development, equipping justice 
institutions with modern facilities and emphasising women’s 
rights. However, overemphasis on quick fixes, prioritisation 
of urban centres, the use of justice institutions in counter-
insurgency efforts and the failure to understand or engage 
with the multiplicity of justice providers have undermined 
fundamental structural reform. All this has resulted in a 
justice system that is less accessible and more corrupt, and 
that lacks full capacity to address the complex new justice 
needs of the Afghan people. This situation has created a 
justice vacuum that is filled by multiple non-state justice 
providers, including the Taliban judiciary.
In its aim to provide accessible, sustainable and inclusive 
justice to all Afghans, the hybrid model offers a coherent 
framework for institutional links between the official state 
justice system, semi-official and unofficial local justice 
providers, as well as existing bodies promoting human 
and women’s rights. By interlinking composite capacities, 
the model not only has the potential to extend justice to 
all Afghans but also promises greater transparency by 
empowering the HRU as a check and balance on rights 
abuses by both courts and jirgas, which in turn would offer 
checks and balances on one another. This is enhanced 
by the fact that women would be in the majority in the 
composition of the HRU. Indeed, research reveals that 
selective implantation of elements of the hybrid model by 
NGOs has resulted in the reduction of baad in Afghanistan.
Due to initial opposition from the state and the AIHRC, 
translating the hybrid model into policy has taken over a 
decade. However, in collaboration with UNDP and the MoJ, 
the author’s recent field research on exploring applicability 
of the model to civil disputes has facilitated a new draft law 
on Conciliation Jirgas in Civil Disputes in Afghanistan. There 
is more work to be done to realise fuller implementation 
of the hybrid model. However, this cannot be fully achieved 
in isolation from achieving inclusive and sustainable 
peace. Justice and peace are inextricably linked in war-
torn Afghanistan and require a multifaceted response. 
As local traditional dispute resolution mechanisms place 
strong emphasis on restoring community harmony, dignity 
and relationships between parties, the hybrid model can 
support social reconciliation and inclusive peacemaking 
among warring parties across the country.
